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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1990s academics and policymakers have advanced 
various ideas for fundamental telecommunications reform in the United 
States.  The immediate challenge for any proposed reform, however, is 
understanding what the point of a telecommunications law is in the first 
place.  Communications networks are part of the nation’s infrastructure, 
and a locus of innovation that inspires visions of a better society.  Yet the 
industry also has a long history of competition problems, monopolization 
and outright corruption that drives a history of regulatory oversight.  
Over the years the reasons for the law have varied with regulatory fash-
ion.  The law today reflects a pastiche of values popular at one time or 
another, like “localism,” “fairness,” “innovation,” and “competition.” 
This paper describes a vision of what telecommunications laws’ 
central goals should be in coming decades, and what kind of legal in-
struments will serve those goals.  The telecommunications law, I suggest, 
has been preoccupied with three projects: allocating rights, managing 
discrimination, and achieving various social goals, like indecency regula-
tion.  This paper argues that in the future the main point of the telecom-
munications law should be as an anti-discrimination regime, and that the 
main challenge for regulators will be getting the anti-discrimination rules 
right. 
The view advanced here, while much popularized over the last dec-
ade, has deeper roots reaching back to the origins of telecommunications 
and common carriage itself.  It views information networks as a form of 
public infrastructure that is most valuable as a general purpose input into 
other activities—a catalyst.  This is at the center of what might be called 
the infrastructure view of network theory, and is at the heart of “innova-
tions commons” theories.1  This single presumption affects the goals of 
communications policy.  It makes it not the maximization of the value of 
the infrastructure for its own sake, but maximization of its value as a 
catalyst for other activities. 
The link between the utility of a network and anti-discrimination 
rules has appeared frequently over the history of telecommunications 
regulation.  From the early days of the telegraph and Bell interconnection 
through today’s network neutrality rules, many (though not all) of the 
regulatory challenges in communications law have featured a network 
owner who conditions or bans carriage.  The regulatory responses have 
been varied and inconsistent.  For example, Western Union’s network 
favoritism helped give Associated Press a nearly unchallenged monopoly 
 1. For an overview of this point, see generally Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A 
User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004). 
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over American news late in the 19th century, with no response from gov-
ernment. Conversely, the FCC rules blocking Bell’s discrimination 
against third-party network attachments, like non-Bell phones, are widely 
seen as a great success, while efforts to combat “discrimination” by forc-
ing the sharing of cable lines and local lines in the 1992 Cable Act and 
1996 Telecom Act, widely seen as failures.  As discrimination rules al-
most certainly become central to the future of telecommunications law, 
there is much to learn from these various uses and abuses of discrimina-
tion norms. 
While of central importance, as the history shows, getting anti-
discrimination rules right is exceptionally challenging.  The first chal-
lenge is to categorically ascertain what types of information networks 
merit anti-discrimination rules in the first place.  The oldest and hardest 
question in the field of common carriage is what exactly constitutes a 
“business affected with a public interest.”2  On today’s networks, that 
usually means distinguishing private from public information networks. 
The second challenge is devising anti-discrimination rules that 
broaden the utility of the network without destroying any incentive to 
build it in the first place.  Regulators using anti-discrimination norms are 
in practice creating rules of market entry, where the challenge is to pro-
vide sufficient controls on incumbents’ power to block market entry 
without destroying the incentives to become an incumbent.3
The third challenge is devising rules that do not themselves become 
tools of incumbent power, the fate of many if not most well-intentioned 
telecommunications regimes. 
For purposes of discussion this paper outlines a “one rule” proposal, 
a hypothetical, single anti-discrimination rule that would form the center 
of telecommunications law.  The rule should be (1) a general norm that is 
technologically neutral, (2) in the form of an ex ante rule with ex post 
remedies, and (3) anchored on a model of consumers’ rights.4  The form 
of the rule recommended here is hardly radical.  Instead, it is something 
of a restatement of the best of telecommunications practice based on 
decades of telecommunications experience.5  It borrows from what, as 
best we can tell, has worked, while shunning the regimes with the great-
est tendency toward corruption. 
 2. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). 
 3. See Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries (Stanford Law 
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 312, 2005). 
 4. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 
FED. COMM. L.J. 225 (2002). 
5. It is like some of the layered models, based on two of U.S. telecommunications law’s 
greatest successes: the Computer Inquiries, and the Part 68 Rules for network attachments. Its 
centerpiece is a rule of antidiscrimination and a two-layer transport/applications distinction 
that is an import of the enhanced/basic service dichotomy from Computer Inquiries. 
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Many caveats are necessary. While the point of the proposal is to 
accomplish as much as possible with as few rules as possible, it obvi-
ously cannot capture everything.  It leaves out at least one other essential 
function of a telecommunications regime: the licensing and the assign-
ment of property rights, or the prior selection of who may be a market 
entrant.  The discussion here deliberately leaves out the social aspects of 
telecommunications regulation that serve very different goals, including 
indecency regulation, progressive redistribution and technical standard 
setting.  It would also be impossible to specify, in full detail, how an 
anti-discrimination regime might handle every conceivable case.  I ex-
plain, instead, what an evolving system of anti-discrimination telecom-
munications law might look like. 
Part 1 provides background on telecommunications reform. Part 2 
discusses the importance, history, and operation of anti-discrimination 
regimes in telecommunications regulation.  Part 3 suggests the different 
ways an anti-discrimination regime might operate. 
I. PROPOSALS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 
Over the last two decades, many have advanced various ideas for 
fundamental telecommunications reform.  All of the proposals have been 
reactions to the current legal structure, which few have praised publicly 
or explicitly.6
The question exists: what does the current telecommunications law 
look like, and what values does it serve?  As telecommunications lawyers 
know well, the current law regulates on the basis of network type.  Each 
of broadcasting, telephones, and cable television get their own regime.  
The first assumption is that transport and services are integrated.  That is 
to say, that both the services provided on the network, and the infrastruc-
ture itself, are owned by the same company, as in today’s telephone and 
cable television networks.  The second assumption is that each type of 
network has separate regulatory concerns. 
A scattered set of values reflecting the fashions of various eras can 
be found expressed through law in the current system.  Concerns of mo-
nopoly pricing have meant price-setting for telephone and cable service.  
Interests of localism and the public interest have led to franchising and 
licensing requirements for cable operators and broadcasters of all kinds.  
In the name of universalism, the telephone companies and a few others 
contribute to a multi-billion dollar universal service fund which subsi-
dizes rural telephony. 
The general impression is that the actual programs lying behind 
 6. As is often the case in communications policy, some parties implicitly praise the cur-
rent system by resisting any manner of reform to it. 
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each of these values, whether or not ever honorable, are now corrupted 
and perverse.  Broadcasting licenses designed to protect localism and 
free television effectively destroyed any competition in local broadcast-
ing.  Worse, they let broadcasters occupy highly valuable public spec-
trum, preventing higher uses than say, UHF broadcasting.  Though parts 
of the universal service fund are used to fund technology in schools, 
large amounts go to subsidize rural phone companies, as if it were 1909 
and telephones might otherwise be beyond the financial reach of farmers.  
While price-setting regimes are perhaps useful for preventing certain 
types of customer abuse, they also force entrants to negotiate with the 
government before getting started.  These problems are well known, yet 
most public officials are quick to voice support for these entitlement pro-
grams, for opposition can be political suicide.  The regulated firms them-
selves are stuck in a strange logical contradiction—they constantly agi-
tate for deregulation for themselves, based on principles like 
“competitiveness.”  Yet since they know the system well, and how to 
make use of it, they tend to resist real or radical change.  They also have 
the capacity to become high regulationists, at least when there is some 
chance to stick market entrants and rivals with onerous duties.  In the 
year 2005, for example, the cable industry, despite years of opposition to 
the duties of local franchising, began discussing how well the local fran-
chising system works, inspired by the possibility that the telephone com-
panies might enter the cable market. 
The larger structure of the resulting system is sometimes called a 
“vertical” or “silo” regulatory system, and it reflects the fact that law-
makers simply wrote a new law for each new network as it arrived.  The 
result is the pile of network-specific laws we know as the Telecommuni-
cations Act. 
Both the absurdity and technological infirmity of the system have 
led to important proposals for reform.  The proposals can be placed into 
two groups: “layered” proposals, and “European” or “antitrust” propos-
als.  What these proposals have in common is that they ask regulators to 
discard the Telecommunications Act’s assumptions of vertically-
integrated services (cable, telephone, etc.).  Where they differ is over 
whether function, or findings of market power, ought be the guiding 
principle of telecommunications law. 
A.   Layered Models 
Proposals for a “layered” telecommunications law suggest getting 
rid of or supplementing the current system and replacing it with a regula-
tory structure that regulates on the basis of function as opposed to his-
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torical contingency.7  Since network functions are generally organized in 
horizontal layers, such proposals are sometimes called “horizontal” mod-
els of telecommunications regulation.  Kevin Werbach, author of one of 
the first layering proposals, writes that a layered model “is most useful in 
framing questions, helping policymakers identify hidden tension points 
and giving them a better vocabulary to craft solutions.”8
In their basic forms, horizontal models are calls for the reform of 
classification.  Proponents of horizontal models want to reform how the 
FCC decides whether it will apply either one rule-set or another to a 
given activity (A).  Today, as just discussed, the FCC makes that deci-
sion based on a “service” approach: by deciding whether activity A is a 
“cable service,” “information service,” “telecommunications service,” 
and so on.  This decision depends on statutory criteria for defining ser-
vices that can be malleable, outdated, or both.  One consequence is that 
similar, competing services may end up being regulated differently, like 
cable and DSL broadband.  Another consequence is long delays and liti-
gation over the FCC’s classification decisions, typified by the Brand X 
litigation.9  A third is that the FCC itself is organized by service type, 
with separate bureaus for wireless, wireline, and “media” services, which 
reinforces the separation. 
The reforms suggested by advocates of horizontal models argue that 
classification decisions should follow from function, not service type. 
Regulators, in other words, should decide which rules to apply depending 
on what network layer Activity A is—not what service type it is.  For ex-
ample, using a simplified TCP/IP protocol stack as an example, they 
should consider whether the activity is at the application layer, network 
layer, or the physical/transport layer, and regulate accordingly. 
 7. See Tim Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163 (1999); 
Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
37 (2002); Douglas Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy 
(2002), http://tprc.org/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf; Lawrence Solum & Minn 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
815 (2004); cf. Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Ar-
chitecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Richard S. 
Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New Public Policy Framework Based on 
the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Joshua L. Mindel & Douglas C. 
Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to Improve a Layered Policy Model for US 
Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. POL’Y 136 (2006); Robert Frieden, Adjusting 
the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Tradi-
tional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003). An important antece-
dent was David Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network, 
http://www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html (last visited October 2, 2006). 
 8. Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digi-
tal Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 95 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005). 
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Figure 1.  “The Horizontal Leap Forward” 
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Why bother making the change from vertical to horizontal?  Advo-
cates give two sets of reasons for why layered regulatory models are at-
tractive.10  The first is descriptive coherence. Since the 1970s, telecom-
munication networks have actually been built on horizontal models.11  It 
is important to realize that the Internet, while an important example, is 
not the only example. Cable television networks and even dedicated 
phone networks have long been conceptualized and built on horizontal 
architectures. The vertical regulatory silos are more out of touch than 
many lawyers may realize.  They reflect practices abandoned in the engi-
neering world decades ago. As Rick Whitt, then at MCI, wrote, “the lay-
ers model represents a shift in thinking that successfully mirrors the way 
that networks and markets actually operate.”12
Greater descriptive coherence is closely related to another heavily 
stressed advantage: that the same types of services be treated similarly, 
and that the right rules apply to the right types of behavior. For example, 
applications and transport services present fundamentally different regu-
latory problems.  Yet at the same time, different types of application ser-
vices, whether labeled “voice,” “video” and so on, present similar regula-
tory problems, and ought to be treated similarly. In the words of Robert 
Cannon of the FCC, “[b]y conceptualizing the policy as layers, the ana-
lyst is capable of grouping and segregating issues.”13 He can “identify 
markets, clarify issues, create boundary regulations that are effective, 
and, in so doing, target solutions where issues reside without interfering 
with other industries and opportunities.”14
 
 10. What follows is a summary. A survey of arguments in favor of a horizontal model 
can be found in Richard Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE & 
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 292, 312-317 (Mark Cooper ed., 2004). 
 11. See ANDREW TANNENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 30 (4th ed. 2002). 
 12. Whitt, supra note 7, at 317. 
 13. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer 
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 195 (2003). 
14.  Id. 
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Much of the criticism of layered models has been based on the 
charge that layered models tend to be either too complicated or inconclu-
sive for regulatory purposes.15  While this paper draws heavily on the 
layered proposals it takes a slightly different tack.  This paper questions 
whether a classification system, horizontal or vertical, is actually neces-
sary to communications regulation at all.  It asks whether the right an-
swer is really to transform the silos, when it may be classification itself 
that is the problem.  The point is that the task of creating regulatory clas-
sifications has often led to delays, litigation and other costs of adminis-
tering such a complex system, ultimately for no apparent reason. 
It is true that there is some necessary minimal complexity in any 
conceivable scheme. Nonetheless if the impact of a regulatory model 
creates the need for classifications and rulings on classifications, those 
are additional costs, and it must be asked whether the costs are justified. 
True to what advocates have said, the layered proposals are most 
important in the minds of the regulator.  As Timothy Denton put it, 
“[h]ow regulators act invariably depends on how they see the world.  The 
most important thing about a layered model is that it can rearrange the 
‘mental furniture’ with which regulators act.”16  The question becomes 
whether a classification system is necessary to ensure that regulators un-
derstand that networks operate on a horizontal model.  The real effort 
should be to ensure that FCC regulators understand modern networks and 
use a de facto layered model in their analysis.  There are promising signs.  
Bryan Tramont, former Chief of Staff to former FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell, for example, explained the FCC’s approach to regulation as fol-
lows:  “The main difference for us is between how we regulate the infra-
structure, and services.  Each has its own concerns and priorities.”17  
Moreover that distinction, as Robert Cannon writes, was a critical matter 
in the Computer Inquiries.18
As developed later, the one-rule proposal has no specific classifica-
tion scheme, though it requires some general jurisdictional limit on what 
constitutes a communications network at all.  However, it does direct 
regulators to consider whether discrimination is (1) between transport in-
frastructures, (2) between transport infrastructures and application ser-
vices, or (3) between application services.  As such, it recommends an 
 15. See, e.g., David P. Reed, Comments at the Silicon Flatirons Conference: The Rise of 
Cable and its Future (Oct. 18, 2005); New Millenium Research Council, Free Ride: Deficien-
cies of the MCI “Layers” Policy Model and the Need for Principles that Encourage Competi-
tion in the New IP World (July 2004), http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/news/ 
071304_report.pdf. 
 16. Timothy Denton, Comments at Freedom to Connect Conference (March 31, 2005). 
 17. See Bryan Tramont, Comments at the Silicon Flatirons Conference: The Digital 
Broadband Migration (Feb. 13, 2005). 
 18. Cannon, supra note 13, at 167-205. 
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implicit, but un-codified two-layer system.  In the mind of the regulator, 
it ought to look something like the following: 
A second criticism of layered models is that they focus on function 
to the exclusion of economics.  Stated differently, while layered models 
may help make function clear, it may be at the cost of ignoring the prob-
lems of market power and its abuse, which can take many forms.  That 
point takes us to the European proposals for telecommunications re-
form.19
B.  European Proposals 
European or “antitrust” proposals for telecommunications reform 
begin from the position that the central problem in telecommunications 
law is market power and its abuse.  The stronger version says that the 
FCC should be replaced altogether by antitrust courts,20 a milder ap-
proach speaks to the attractions of Europe’s telecommunications re-
gime.21
Here is a brief description of how the scheme created by the Euro-
pean Directives works.22  The European Commission was given the task 
of defining the relevant telecommunications markets in existence.  Next, 
the “National Regulatory Authority,” or telecom regulator, in each mar-
ket uses economic methods to assess whether “Significant Market 
Power” exists in any of the markets within its borders.  If it does, the 
regulator is to impose one of various ex ante remedies, such as a duty to 
offer wholesale unbundling, price controls, or anti-discrimination rules.  
If, conversely, the regulator does not find market power, it is obliged to 
get rid of any extant rules for that market. 
The European proposals put an important concept front and center, 
also pushed by American academics: that telecommunications law pre-
sents economic questions identical or similar to those faced in antitrust 
 
 19. Sicker, supra note 7, at 10 (“[W]e should not confuse the technical implementation of 
the Internet with the policy goals of a layered model. What we should take away from the pro-
tocol design is its design philosophy; including things like decentralized control, autonomy, 
efficiency, etc.”). 
 20. See PETER HUBER, LAW & DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 3 (1997). 
 21. See J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States of the European 
Union’s Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications (FCC Office of Plans 
& Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 2002). 
 22. See Council Directive 2002/19, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 19 (EC); Council Directive 
2002/20, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 20 (EC). 
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regulation.23  The economic problems in telecommunications, in this 
view, are caused by discrete types of market failure—like network ef-
fects, economies of scale, and monopoly leveraging.  Telecommunica-
tions law should therefore premise its actions on the same criteria as 
modern antitrust, where findings of market power play the starring role. 
As with the layered proposals, there is much to praise in the Euro-
pean approach.  The European approach represents the world’s most am-
bitious effort to make telecommunications law generalized to the prob-
lems of 21st century technology.24  Additionally, if the Europeans are 
right that most, but not all, agree that telecommunications law faces 
problems similar to antitrust, one may ask if there is any real disagree-
ment. 
There are two grounds for disagreement. The first criticism of 
European-style reform may not be so much a substantive disagreement as 
a  procedural one.  In a world of perfect information, all regulatory action 
would be premised on exact findings of market power.  Furthermore, in 
such a world, market players would be able to predict in advance that 
such action would be forthcoming.  However, in this world and in the 
United States, gathering information with respect to market power means 
time, errors, and some manner of adversarial process.  The result may be 
unduly weak protection for potential market entrants and their inves-
tors.25
Some support for this contention comes from the experience with 
the American branch of market-power dependent telecommunication 
law, which is better known as the antitrust law.  While writers like Peter 
Huber have argued that antitrust courts would be an appropriate replace-
ment for the FCC,26 no one doubts that antitrust action is expensive and 
slow. James Speta writes of the most aggressive and extensive use of an-
titrust in telecommunications law history, against the AT&T monopoly: 
MCI’s litigation against AT&T, which was based upon serious and 
repetitive anticompetitive activities by AT&T, did not by itself result 
in any substantial change in AT&T’s behavior.  AT&T did agree to 
divest itself of the Bell companies as the result of government anti-
trust litigation, but that result came eight years after the government 
instituted the case and thirty-three years after the government origi-
nally tried by antitrust means to control AT&T’s anti-competitive  be-
 23. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 1 
(2004) (discussing use of antitrust and telecommunications law for similar purposes); see also 
Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 286 n.24 (2005). 
 24. Some critics argue that giving telecommunications law an antitrust orientation ne-
glects other, non-qualitative values. 
 25. See Segal & Whinston, supra note 3. 
 26. HUBER, supra note 20. 
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havior.27
In the language of American telecommunications policy, invoking anti-
trust as an alternative is often a polite code word for doing nothing. If the 
European approach transported to American soil means anything like an 
antitrust process, the results could be too ineffective to serve any goal of 
communications policy, other than doing nothing.  In particular, if sig-
nificant barriers to entry are blocking competitive entry, a long antitrust-
style process may be cold comfort to investors in market entrants. 
But even if antitrust principles could be affected there is a second 
criticism of the European approach that is more fundamental.  The focus 
on market power may neglect some of the social benefits of general pur-
pose networks, independent of market power concerns.  Stated in eco-
nomic terms, while market power can create one form of market failure 
in telecommunications, there is another problem: externality problems.  
Non-discriminatory networks may be valuable and worth preserving 
even in the absence of significant market power because of the inde-
pendent economic value as a source of spillovers for other activities.  
Public infrastructures, in this view, are a collective good that some 
minimal government action preserves.28  This point will be developed 
further in what follows, and in the discussion of common carriage. 
To be fair, European telecommunications law, but not necessarily 
U.S. antitrust practice, is partially sensitive to both of these criticisms. 
While often presented as here, as anchored to findings of market power, 
part of the European law (the Access Directive) requires “operators of 
public communications networks” to interconnect regardless of any find-
ings of market power.29  In addition, as opposed to the lengthy ex post 
antitrust process used in the United States, the European approach im-
poses ex-ante regulations on firms based on findings of market power 
without evidence of abuse of their market position. 
* * * 
The discrimination-centered approach elaborated in the remainder 
of this paper borrows heavily from the two proposals just described.  
While premised on the same economic principles that motivate the Euro-
pean proposals, it advocates a discrimination system that is premised on 
an implicit two-layer model.  It also draws strongly on and further devel-
 27. Speta, supra note 4, at 277. 
 28. A related argument is made by Barbara van Schewick, who points out that the fact 
that a network operator faces competition in its primary market may make it want to capture 
additional exclusive revenue in complementary markets. Barbara van Schewick, Towards an 
Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=812991. 
 29. Council Directive 2002/20, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 20 (EC). 
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ops earlier proposals by Eli Noam and James Speta, both of whom have 
advocated some form of new anti-discrimination norm in different 
ways.30  The point of the one-rule proposal is to try to capture some of 
the advantages of the horizontal regulatory models in a workable, practi-
cable, and simple fashion. 
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RULES 
It might be useful to return to the subject of the introduction and 
discuss what the purpose of telecommunications policy should be in the 
first place, and how that connects to the law itself. 
I see the regulators’ task as trying, as best as possible, to foster the 
vibrancy and health of the part of the nation’s public infrastructure called 
its information networks.  Information networks make possible a large 
range of activities—commercial, such as corporate meetings; political, 
such as news distribution; and purely personal; such as the planning of 
birthday parties and happy hours.  Networks also catalyze innovation, 
both in the network itself, and in activities that depend on the transport 
network, from voice communications through online travel agents.  A 
chief goal of telecommunications policy, in this view, is to maximize the 
value of the information networks as a catalyst for all these activities. 
Both network ideology and government policies can affect how 
valuable the networks are as a catalyst or input into other activities.  The 
more general-purpose the network is, the more generally valuable the 
network is.  That is the essence of the infrastructure theory of networks, 
and also what motivated the “end-to-end” principle of network design.  
The essence of the end-to-end principle is that the most valuable network 
is that which supports the broadest number of uses. 
The analogy to urban planning is obvious but worth repeating.  A 
street and a sidewalk have a value that in part derives from their multi-
plicity of uses.  Stores on Fifth Avenue can sell hats, coats, toys and cof-
fee.  The urban planner doesn’t need to decide the use, and does better by 
not deciding.31  A dedicated network is like a street designed from the 
outset to sell, say, top hats.  Surely the dedicated network, in the begin-
ning, is not useless, but less useful than perhaps it could be.  It is also a 
street that could face a serious problem when top hats go out of fashion. 
If the goal is to maximize the value of the information networks as a 
catalyst for commercial, political, and personal activities, it would be 
useful to speak of the dangers that face the telecommunications regula-
tor.  The first is over planning, both public and private.  Government has 
 30. See Speta, supra note 4; Noam, infra note 60. 
 31. Cf. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 222 (1961) 
(“Intricate minglings of different uses in cities are not a form of chaos.  On the contrary, they 
represent a complex and highly developed form of order.”). 
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sometimes had success planning the future, usually by funding scientists 
who then build what they think the future should be (the story of the 
internet’s origins.32)  But unless they give money to scientists, regula-
tors’ and legislative efforts to plan the future, influenced by what today’s 
powers think that future should be, have a storied history of failure.  In 
the 1960s television broadcasters managed to convince the FCC that 
UHF was the technology of the future, cable a trifle and threat to local-
ism.  That was then, yet today the FCC and Congress remain officially 
committed to a planned second-coming of broadcast television, akin to 
the resurrection of UHF, known as broadcast digital television.  It is 
scheduled to arrive sometime in the 2010s and seems likely to be dead on 
arrival.  Were it to succeed, billions of dollars in public money will have 
been spent to make televisions slightly larger.  Whatever the result, far 
more money has been and will be spent on the project of enlarging tele-
visions than on something called the internet and the technology of 
broadband. 
Such tales may give rise to libertarian twitching and thoughts of to-
tal deregulation, but the flip-side of government inaction is no less seri-
ous.  The non-hypothetical danger is that private network owners will in-
dividually destroy the collective value of the public networks.  Of course, 
the value of activities that depend on a network also make the network 
valuable, leading to a natural incentive to support a network with varied 
and valuable uses.33  However, we also know network owners may have 
good reason to deviate from what is in the collective interest.  Consider 
two persistent reasons.  First, it is no secret or surprise that incumbent 
firms act first and foremost to preserve their existing investments and to 
nullify competitive threats.  To the extent activities facilitated by the 
network challenge the incumbent firm’s existing investments, firms try to 
block them.  This is particularly a threat to dramatic innovation that 
threatens to take over vested interests.  Stated otherwise, no firm plans on 
its own death, even if the downfall of the firm is actually in the public 
interest. 
Second, firms cannot internalize or capture all of the public benefits 
of an infrastructure they own, particularly those benefits that are hard to 
commodify.  As Brett Frischman and Mark Lemely observe, infrastruc-
tures are a form of good that tend to create spillovers.34 Consider urban 
planning again.  How possibly could the owner of a sidewalk capture the 
 32. See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 
(1996). 
 33. This point is explained carefully in Joseph Farell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Ver-
tical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regula-
tion in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003). 
 34. Mark A. Lemley & Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin 
Working Paper No. 321, April 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898881. 
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value of conversations held walking along, or thoughts that ramble, or 
the joys of window-shopping?  The problem is that incumbent firms may 
make sad efforts to capture some of the value of what their infrastructure 
inspires. In the process of trying to capture for themselves more of the 
public value of what transpires on their network, firms can lessen or de-
stroy the value of the network as a catalyst for other activities.  This is 
the great tragedy of badly executed “value-added” network models.  By 
trying to extract side payments for services usually otherwise available 
and better provided elsewhere, the risk is diminishing the real value of 
the network. 
The challenge in dealing with the previously described behavior is 
the usual pitfall of unintended consequences.  We have seen that so many 
seemingly well-motivated regulations become twisted to serve new and 
perverse ends.  In some way, they usually end up guaranteeing some sta-
ble income to an incumbent, and/or form a barrier either to new net-
works, or new innovations that depend on access to networks.  In other 
words, one of the gravest perils in telecommunications law is the law it-
self and its capacity to entrench. 
These fears on both sides may make telecommunications policy 
seem nearly impossible.  Additionally, there are problems caused by raw 
market power that go beyond the scope of this discussion.  The following 
is designed to minimize the various evils identified above.  As detailed 
below, the anti-discrimination norms have historically been among the 
most effective and least involved of available government remedies.  
Moreover, an anti-discrimination rule that creates strong ex-ante norms 
can be an effective measure for preventing private suffocation of what 
would otherwise be a vibrant information network.  It can preserve the 
health of separate markets that rely on the network as an input, so that 
the network owner does not become as bad a centralized planner as the 
government. 
A. The Use and Abuse of Anti-Discrimination Rules 
There are many excellent histories of American telecommunications 
policy available, and what follows is not a contribution.  Instead the fol-
lowing emphasizes two points.  First, telecommunications regulators 
have been dealing with discrimination problems for a very long time un-
der a variety of labels like “common carriage,” “interconnection,” and 
will likely continue to do so.  The second point being the techniques used 
to combat perceived discrimination problems are varied, and the success 
and failure of measures differ.  While it is difficult to be conclusive in 
drawing from history presented, the following presents several examples 
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that help frame how discrimination problems arise.35
The examples discussed here have several features in common.  
Consumers have an interest in using their network in a given way, either 
to reach someone on another network, to attach a given device, or use a 
given service reachable over the network.  Sometimes, though the differ-
ence can be subtle, companies are interested in reaching consumers with 
a given service or content.  In response and for a variety of reasons, the 
carrier blocks or makes difficult either the consumer or the company’s 
access to consumers, often leading to some kind of government action. 
* * * 
The United States’ first electric information network was the tele-
graph, and with it came a paradigmatic story of network discrimination 
that can serve as a model for much that has followed.  The electric tele-
graph was developed by British and American inventors, including Sam-
uel Morse, in the late 1830s.  In the United States, the first deployments 
were financed and owned by the federal government, rather like the early 
Internet.  By 1866 a private company, Western Union, through acquiring 
rivals had consolidated a near-complete monopoly position in telegraph 
service.36
One of the most important early customers for the telegraph was the 
press.  The telegraph made it possible to find out, faster than through 
land mail, what was happening in other parts of the country.  Access to a 
telegraph network was, for a newspaper, an obvious advantage.  After 
consolidating its monopoly in 1866, Western Union made an exclusive 
deal with the Associated Press, and granted AP preferential access to its 
network.  In exchange, AP members made the startling promise not to 
“encourage or support any opposition or competing Telegraph Com-
pany.”  Western Union’s actions were a classic, and perhaps defining ex-
ample of network discrimination. 
In this instance we can clearly see the problem presented by net-
work discrimination. Western Union may have helped itself, but the 
more serious problem was the distortion of competition among newspa-
pers.  As telecommunications historian Paul Starr writes, “Western Un-
ion had exclusive contracts with the railroads; AP had exclusive con-
tracts with Western Union; and individual newspapers had exclusive 
 35. For more detailed historical treatments, see Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Commu-
nications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); Kevin Werbach, The Federal 
Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2005); PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE 
MEDIA (2005). 
 36. For more on the early history of the telegraph, see ROBERT L. THOMPSON, WIRING A 
CONTINENT: THE HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 1832-66 
(1947); see also DANIEL J. CZITROM, MEDIA AND THE AMERICAN MIND 1 (1982). 
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contracts with AP.  These linkages made it difficult for rival news ser-
vices to break in.”37  Another problem is that while Western Union’s 
telegraph might have been used for a variety of newspaper types that 
might have flourished, all was sacrificed to the AP model. 
In his work, Starr contrasts the difference between the American 
telegraph system and the British telegraph, which was run like the postal 
system, on a neutral basis.  “Britain’s postal telegraph helped equalize 
power between the provincial and metropolitan press, whereas Western 
Union helped stronger papers dominate weaker ones.”38  The influence 
of the AP monopoly was to have a lasting and well documented effect on 
national politics.  Historian Menahem Blondheim has carefully docu-
mented AP’s use of its monopoly to influence politics in the late 19th 
century, and much of it relies on AP’s preferential access to the telegraph 
network.39  AP, sympathetic to Hayes and the Republican party, simply 
flooded the telegraph wires with Republican campaign materials, and re-
fused to carry most stories coming from the Democratic party.40
Western Union’s discriminatory practices were eventually remedied 
through the device of “common carriage.”  In 1888, Congress gave the 
Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate subsidized tele-
graph lines, and in 1910, Congress declared telegraph companies to be 
common carriers.  The “common carriage” concept was preserved in the 
1934 Communications Act and still forms the basis for the regulation of 
telephone carriers, and thus necessitates a close look. 
As an anti-discrimination regime, common-carriage is important 
both historically and conceptually.  The concept, as refined in the 19th 
century, can minimally be described as requiring “businesses affected 
with the public interest” to offer their services to all without discrimina-
tion, at just and reasonable rates, in exchange for certain immunities. 
The questions remain who falls within the common-law definition 
of common-law carriage and what makes a business affected with the 
public interest?  The Supreme Court struggled for decades in the late 
19th and early 20th century with these difficult questions in the law of 
common carriage.  Common-carriers were historically defined by their 
economic function: the carriage of goods or information, open to the 
public, without substantial transformation of those goods or information.  
Common carriage is premised on the idea, usually traced to Lord Hale, 
that special public duties must attend certain types of private business 
that provided essential social functions, like transportation. 
A key to understanding common carriage is that the early defini-
 37. STARR, supra note 35, at 184. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See MENAHEM BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES 1844-97 (1994). 
40.  Id. 
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tions had little to do with market power.  Instead, the definition was 
strictly based on the type of business in question.  In the words of a 19th 
century treatise, a common carrier is a person who “exercise[s] the busi-
ness of carrying as a ‘public employment,’ and must undertake to carry 
goods for all persons indiscriminately; and hold himself out as ready to 
engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a business, and not as a 
casual occupation pro hac vice.”41  In other words, it is the role the car-
rier plays in the economy that necessitates duties of common carriage, 
not necessarily the potential for abuse of market power. 
These conclusions are fortified by the work of Professor Thomas 
Nachbar, who has carefully studied the historic patterns of common car-
riage rulings, and tried to understand which businesses were given com-
mon carriage duties.42  He concluded that factors like necessity, the 
“networked” nature of the business, and market power have always 
played a role.  Yet the clearest point of commonality is affiliation with 
transportation or communications where the inherent public interest in 
transportation and communications infrastructure seems to make all the 
difference. 
* * * 
The second major discrimination story comes from the early tele-
phone networks.  By the early part of the 20th century, AT&T was owner 
of many local exchange carriers and also the nation’s finest long-distance 
network.  AT&T did not, as Western Union had, discriminate so obvi-
ously between what kind of end-users might be allowed to use its basic 
services.  AT&T practiced a different form of discrimination.  Its com-
petitive strategy was to refuse to allow non-affiliated carriers to connect 
to its long-distance network, so as to starve local rivals out of exis-
tence.43
AT&T’s behavior posed a different puzzle of network discrimina-
tion. Consumers on given networks wanted to reach people on other tele-
phone networks but needed Bell’s interconnection to do so, which Bell 
withheld. That behavior and an aggressive acquisition program which 
led, among other things, it to owning Western Union, attracted the atten-
tion of the Justice Department.  Eventually, in a 1913 letter, AT&T 
agreed to interconnect its long-distance services with independent tele-
phone carriers, a promise now known as the Kingsbury Commitment.44
 41. THOMPSON CHITTY & LEOFRIC TEMPLE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY LAND, INLAND NAVIGATION, AND IN SHIPS 14-
15 (1857). 
 42. See Thomas Nachbar, Open Access (2006) (on file with author). 
 43. See generally Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 369 (2004). 
 44. For a discussion of the Kingsbury Commitment, see Peter Huber, Loose Ends, 4 
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As an anti-discrimination remedy, the Kingsbury Commitment was 
partial. It blocked one form of discrimination, long-distance to local, 
while leaving AT&T free to engage in other forms. At the local-local 
level, AT&T never agreed to connect to independent local carriers.  It 
also never agreed to interconnect either its long distance or local net-
works with competing long-distance carriers.  Consequently, as many 
have documented, the Kingsbury Commitment, along with many other 
strategies, ultimately lead to AT&T consolidating its position in Ameri-
can telephone service as a regulated monopoly. 
During the long period of “pure” AT&T monopoly, from 1913 
through 1968, telephone service was subject to the common-law anti-
discrimination duties of common-carriage discussed above.  The duties 
were codified in the 1934 Communications Act.45  The overall system 
for regulating the AT&T monopoly has been heavily criticized.  Indeed, 
criticism of the common-carriage model is the starting point for much 
contemporary telecommunications writing.  The main point is that the 
FCC’s system largely protected AT&T from any serious competition.  
Yet it is hard to see how it might have been the anti-discrimination duties 
of common carriage alone, as opposed to other incidents of the law, that 
are to blame.  The anti-discrimination duties were only part of the regula-
tory regime that AT&T was subject to.  AT&T was and still is subject to 
rate-setting, universal service subsidies, and various other duties.  More 
importantly, potential entrants required FCC permission to begin offering 
phone service.  Given the threat of such entry, AT&T would invariably 
complain that entrants would “cherry-pick” profitable services and de-
stroy the system of subsidies built into in the universal service system.46
The efforts of AT&T to block nearly any kind of market entrant led 
to a third story of discrimination in telecommunications, the well-known 
story of network attachments.  In the 1950s and 1960s, consumers began 
to want the freedom to connect devices to their telephone lines.  At first, 
telephone-accessories, and later on, telephones made by companies other 
than Bell, and later answering machines, fax machines, and modems.  
Since the FCC at first blocked even the attachment of a simple rubber 
cup to a telephone, it fell to the D.C. Circuit to suggest a non-
discrimination rule for network attachments.  It did so in the Hush-a-
Phone decision, creating the following rule: a telephone subscriber has a 
MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 1-2 (1995). 
 45. The Act states “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or 
unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities or ser-
vices . . . or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, 
class or persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to 
any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.” 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1934). 
 46. See CHARLES KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 
(2d ed. 2001). 
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“right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately bene-
ficial without being publicly detrimental.”47
While Hush-a-Phone was decided in 1956, it was not until 1981 that 
the FCC completed the deregulation of consumer network attachments.  
Along the way, it announced the Carterfone principle, leading to the Part 
68 Rules, which let users connect whatever they wanted so long as it cre-
ated no harm to the network or other users.48  In 1981, in the Computer II 
decision, the FCC enacted a strong non-discrimination rule for consumer 
network equipment, and even blocked the regional Bell operating com-
panies from offering such equipment other than through an independent 
subsidiary. 
The creation of an anti-discrimination regime for consumer equip-
ment is widely seen as a great success, and is arguably a model for the 
Telecommunications law generally.  FCC economists Jay M. Atkinson 
and Christopher C. Barnekov describe the impact of banning discrimina-
tion against competing consumer equipment providers: 
It is difficult to overestimate the impact of Computer II’s decision to 
give customers the right to purchase CPE [Consumer Premises 
Equipment] outright, rather than only to buy discrete CPE services 
from the LEC [Local Exchange Carrier].  We will not attempt to 
prove this assertion here, but we believe that the recent development 
of the Internet, and of much of Information Technology, would not 
have happened if CPE (for example, modems) were still marketed 
only by LECs.  The blossoming of the CPE market into a highly 
competitive industry offering a wide variety of choice at low cost and 
rapid technological advances, and enabling previously unknown pos-
sibilities such as the increasingly numerous Internet services, is ar-
guably a direct consequence of the deregulation of CPE.49
The most prominent feature of the CPE rule is that it completely sepa-
rated network attachments, as a market, from telephone service and re-
quired AT&T to allow any safe usage of its network. 
The next example of how network discrimination can arise is the 
“must-carry” rules.  Traditionally, broadcasters originated and cable 
companies carried television content.  In the early days of television, ca-
ble channels fought hard for the right to carry broadcast content of ABC, 
CBS, etc., without permission.  Then by the 1980s the tables turned, and 
 47. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 48. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 
571 (1968). See also Werbach, supra note 8. 
 49. See Jay Atkinson & Christopher Barnekov, A Competitively Neutral Approach to 
Network Interconnection 3 (Office of Plans & Policy, FCC, Working Paper No. 34, 2000), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp34.pdf. 
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Broadcasters fought to require cable operators to carry its content.  While 
there have been many versions of must-carry requirements, the clearest 
were the rules in the 1992 Cable Act, which required large cable opera-
tors to devote channels to essentially every broadcast station operating in 
the same area as the cable operator.50
Must-carry has some similarities and some differences to the other 
regimes considered here.  Broadcast stations argued that they were seek-
ing access to their customers through the cable network.  They accused 
the cable operators of discriminating against local stations in favor of 
their own, affiliated programmers.  The broadcasters went so far as to 
write this as a Congressional finding in the Act.  As the Act states, “cable 
operators have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated pro-
grammers. This could make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated pro-
grammers to secure carriage on cable systems.”51
Many see the must-carry laws as simply a form of industrial protec-
tion for an uncompetitive set of UHF stations.  However, were the must-
carry laws in any way distinguishable in principle from some of the other 
non-discrimination rules discussed here?  Arguably, yes.  The purpose of 
the law was at no point actually linked to consumer demand, as opposed 
to the needs of a competing industry.  As the Supreme Court wrote, 
“Congress found that the physical characteristics of cable transmission, 
compounded by the increasing concentration of economic power in the 
cable industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast tele-
vision stations to compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary 
operating revenues. Congress determined that regulation of the market 
for video programming was necessary to correct this competitive imbal-
ance.”52  In other words, as the Supreme Court suggested, Congress’s 
primary interest was saving marginal broadcasters from cable.  In the sto-
ries of the telegraph, the telephone, and later the internet, there is no par-
ticular need to discriminate as among users or content providers by the 
nature of the service itself.  Cable service, at least in the 1980s, was still 
limited in its number of channels and the law was not preserving compe-
tition between competing content providers, but giving one class of con-
tent providers a permanent advantage. 
The last anti-discrimination story is from the early days of broad-
band regulation. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, consumers began to 
attach new devices to their internet connections, and use internet services 
that were not in existence in the mid-1990s.  The reaction of many 
broadband operators was to impose various contractual limits on the ac-
tivities of their subscribers. In the best known examples, they disciplined 
 50. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1992). 
 51. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1992). 
 52. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1994). 
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users of Virtual Private Networks.  AT&T, as a cable operator, warned 
users that using a Wi-Fi service for home-networking constituted “theft 
of service” and a federal crime.53
These early instances of broadband discrimination prompted a rem-
edy known as the “network neutrality” regime.  FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell in 2004 first announced the relevant non-discrimination rules, 
which he called the principles of “Network Freedom.”54 As he explained 
later, “My approach is like this: we give companies a lot of room to do 
what they want. But they need to know, when they break the rules, we’re 
going to really slam them.”55  Under pressure from the FCC and con-
sumer groups, the broadband operators generally relaxed their most glar-
ing limits.  Later, in the spring of 2005, in the Madison River case, the 
FCC for the first time showed a willingness to enforce its network neu-
trality rules, fining a local telephone carrier for blocking VoIP service. 
As then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell stated, “The industry must ad-
here to certain consumer protection norms if the Internet is to remain an 
open platform for innovation.”56
* * * 
This very brief look at the history of non-discrimination rules in 
telecommunications makes clear the challenges and pitfalls of managing 
network discrimination.  An anti-discrimination rule can become part of 
a larger scheme that is used to deter competitive entry, as in the regula-
tion of AT&T.  Purported anti-discrimination rules can be used as merely 
a form of industrial life-support, as in the must-carry episode.  Yet doing 
nothing at all, as in the early days of the telegraph industry, can lead to 
serious anti-competitive behavior that distorts not only infrastructure 
competition, but the economic freedoms of the press. 
Alternatively, anti-discrimination rules are essential to the health of 
telecommunications networks, yet must be used with great care.  What 
follows in the last section is a discussion of what best practices in the 
administration of an anti-discrimination regime look like. 
III.  AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION REGIME 
A central challenge for an antidiscrimination-based system and a 
 53. See Wu, infra note 61, at n.57. 
 54. Powell’s discussion of “Internet freedom” focuses on users’ rights. The “freedoms” 
relevant here are (1) freedom to access content, (2) freedom to use applications, and (3) free-
dom to attach personal devices. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding 
Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 12 (2004). 
 55. Michael K. Powell, Former Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Com-
ment at the Silicon Flatirons Conference: The Digital Broadband Migration (Feb. 14, 2005). 
 56. Jonathan Krim, Phone Company Settles in Blocking of Internet Calls, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 4, 2005, at E2. 
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central challenge of telecommunications policy is differentiating between 
“bad” and “justified” discrimination.  Should leeway be given to network 
providers who want to “internalize complementary externalities,” or pro-
vide their own specialized services? Should a carrier be forced to serve 
all customers, or only those who can pay?  How about treating customers 
differently based on their needs?  Does there need to be a public/private 
distinction? 
Given a general anti-discrimination norm, this section discusses 
several ways to approach the design of anti-discrimination system.  The 
first focuses on the type of or category of discrimination, where the most 
relevant question is whether the discrimination in question implicates the 
neutrality of an important public infrastructure. 
A. Discrimination Type 
One approach is to categorize the types of discrimination problems 
that emerge.  Network discrimination tends to fall into three categories: 
(1) between rival transport infrastructures, and (2) between transport in-
frastructures and application services, and (3) between rival applications 
services. 
What follows discusses each type separately.  However, the general 
point is that infrastructure-based discrimination should be suspect, in-
cluding infrastructure discrimination that affects the market for applica-
tions. 
1. Between Rival Transportation Services (interconnection) 
Anti-discrimination remedies as between transport infrastructures 
are better known as “interconnection” requirements.  They have a central 
place in the history of American telephone regulation, including but not 
limited to the Kingsbury Commitment, and later in both the 1934 Act’s 
interconnection requirement (now §201) and the various orders related to 
the 1984 breakup of the AT&T system.  As discussed earlier, the Euro-
pean system continues to retain broad interconnection requirements. 
The interconnection requirements are historically derived from 
common carriage rules, and the economic justification as a means of fa-
cilitating market entry is strong and well known.57  Transportation infra-
structures have well-known, unusual economics that lead to outcomes 
like natural monopolies, market oligopolies, and government programs 
like universal service and subsidization.  The usual argument for inter-
connection is premised on network effects.  The argument is that because 
a larger network is more valuable than a smaller one, without any duty to 
 57. See generally Speta, supra note 4, at 251. 
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interconnect, smaller carriers will have great difficulty entering the mar-
ket.  As James Speta argues, advocating a general interconnection duty 
for internet providers: 
Where there are network effects, one manner of decreasing the barri-
ers to entry is an interconnection technology or requirement. In this 
manner, new (and smaller) companies can connect to the incumbent’s 
installed base.  It is for this reason that communications law (from the 
1934 Communications Act to and including the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996) has always included interconnection requirements. 
Without the ability for new companies to promise customers that they 
will also be able to place calls to and receive calls from subscribers of 
the incumbent telephone carriers, new entrants would never stand a 
chance.58
As Speta argues in general, the economic case for transportation-level 
interconnection is strong.  It suggests that the absence of an interconnec-
tion duty for physical networks other than the telephone network is a 
mistake.  In other words, a foundation of minimal telecommunications 
regulation is the duty for all transport infrastructure providers to inter-
connect their networks. 
2. Between Applications and Transport 
The case for interconnection between transport infrastructures has 
traditionally been taken as the stronger and more obvious case.  Many 
writers, along with the European Union, consider interconnection reme-
dies an easy case but are more hesitant about policing discrimination as 
between transport infrastructures and service.  This paper argues, to the 
contrary, that in the coming decades, anti-discrimination rules as be-
tween applications and transport services are the single greatest priority 
for the telecommunications law. 
The main reason is this.  Applications or “services” have long been 
closely bundled with given transport infrastructures.  Their separation, 
however, by the design of the internet has led to an explosion of innova-
tion and the creation of a range of new competitive markets for searches, 
online auctions, and many other services.  The importance of anti-
discrimination rules in this context is generally to protect the open mar-
ket in applications services from the well-known distortions and oddities 
of the physical infrastructure market. 
Stated differently, the prevention of the distortion of the applica-
tions market is central to making communications networks useful public 
infrastructures and platforms for innovation.  The strongest track record 
 58. Id. 
007 WU-RERUN 10/11/2006  3:23:43 PM 
38 J . ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol. 5 
of innovation comes from the network edges, not the center.  As previ-
ously discussed, one simple reason is simply numerical.  Networks have 
hundreds of millions of users and potential innovations while the number 
of network owners is limited.  Hence, most efforts to control the network 
from the center, however well intentioned, will intentionally or inadver-
tently block innovators at the edges.  The second problem is that every-
one will invariably make mistakes.  However, mistakes made by the 
network centers can persist for decades, and stall the entire economy, 
while mistakes made by edge innovators simply mean another company 
dies.  In short, telecommunications’ central and most important anti-
discrimination rule might be understood as the safeguarding of easy-
entry service markets from infrastructure economics. 
3. Between Applications 
A third type of discrimination is between applications services.  
These problems arise on the internet.  Some examples are problems be-
tween competing email, instant message, or “talk” services.  These prob-
lems are conceptually similar to transportation level interconnection.  
The problems are problems of “horizontal” interconnection as opposed to 
the “vertical” problems that are seen as between applications and trans-
port. 
As with interconnection between transportation infrastructures, we 
face a familiar problem.  Given the network tendency to converge toward 
a single standard, what kind of government action is necessary?  I sug-
gest that application-layer discrimination is presumptively less of a prob-
lem or a suspect class than the previous two categories.  The reasoning 
simply derives from examinations of conditions for market entry.  So 
long as entry is not blocked by actors at the infrastructure layer, better 
technologies ought to be capable of supplanting inferior ones, even given 
network effects.  Factually, this is the track record of network services, 
various generations of talk programs have entered the market, despite the 
supposed dominance of AOL or other chat programs. 
B. Zoning Discrimination–Private Public Distinctions 
A common and useful approach in running an anti-discrimination 
system is to create zones where discrimination is allowed and disal-
lowed.  As discussed above, common carriage law was traditionally oc-
cupied with the distinction between “public” business, and the rest, 
which were presumably “private.”  The same distinction is central to the 
anti-discrimination regime surrounding public accommodations in the 
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United States.59  As the example, goes, if you operate a restaurant, you 
must serve customers of all races but you have no duty to invite the man 
on the street to a dinner party at your house.  What discrimination duties 
attach in either case depends on the extent to which the carrier seeks the 
benefits of being a public accommodation or carrier. 
This same distinction is of great utility for telecommunications 
regulators.  The regulator might map out zones of non-discrimination.  
The inspiration for this position is a 1994 paper written by Professor Eli 
Noam.  Noam suggested that reform of telecommunications might center 
on the principle of “neutral interconnection.”  The idea is to offer carriers 
a choice: be a fully private carrier, and discriminate as you like, or inter-
connect with other carriers, and become subject to anti-discrimination 
requirements.  As Noam wrote: 
A carrier can elect to be private by running its own self-contained in-
frastructure, and having full control over its content, use and access. 
But if it interconnects into other networks and accepts transmission 
traffic from them, it cannot pick some bits over other bits. This means 
that while a private carrier can be selective in its direct customers, 
whether they are end-users or content providers, it cannot be selective 
in what it accepts from another interconnected carrier. . . .All of 
common carriages’ free-flow, goals of low transaction cost, and no-
liability goals are thus preserved by a system of (a) non-exclusive in-
terconnection (b) neutral traffic acceptance.60
Under Noam’s approach, the telecommunications world would be di-
vided into zones of discrimination.  He calls for something similar to the 
absolutist position on public networks, but allows total freedom to dis-
criminate in private zones. 
This distinction between public and private networks is useful.  It 
recognizes that private, non-connected networks may derive much value 
from their discriminatory nature.  At the same time, it sees the public 
networks as necessarily more neutral, reflecting society’s greater inter-
ests in that respect.  One way to implement the public/private distinction 
on modern information networks is called “police what you own.”61  
This approach distinguishes between discrimination that is premised on 
local criteria versus internetwork criteria.  In other words, network pro-
viders of all types have the freedom to discriminate on their local net-
work on the basis of criteria that are entirely under the control of the lo-
 59. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6)-(7) (2000). 
 60. Eli Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 435, 452 (1994). 
 61. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 167-71 (2003). 
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cal network.  For example, in the broadband context, a provider may de-
cide what they want to offer such as different types of bandwidth, or 
even prioritized access to content on their own network.  However, once 
a provider makes that decision they may never discriminate of the basis 
of internetwork criteria or content and applications from other networks. 
C. Justifications 
Discrimination regimes also may differ on the degree to which they 
accept justifications for deviations from neutrality.  The analogy to anti-
discrimination rules in employment should be obvious.  Under Title VII, 
employers are barred from discrimination unless there exist grounds for 
discrimination—a “bona fide occupational qualification” in the jargon of 
employment law.62 The question is, what should the allowable justifica-
tions be in a telecommunications anti-discrimination regime? 
1. Absolute Neutrality 
The absolutist position argues that neutral public carriage should be 
taken as an absolute principle that should never be susceptible to case-
by-case justification.  The absolutist position begins from a core case of 
the internet and the problem of “bit discrimination.”  An absolutist would 
suggest that carriers must, absent the strongest of compelling reasons, 
treat all bits, all ones and zeros, alike.  Data is data and carriers must of-
fer neutral carriage.  Carriers should make no discrimination in their car-
riage on the basis of origin or destination, application type, content, or 
anything else. 
In its strongest forms, for example, the absolutist position insists 
that Internet service providers should not block known spam sites, based 
on the proposition that control of spam should be handled by the network 
ends.  It also goes without saying that the absolutist position takes a dim 
view of a carriers’ desire to prioritize certain forms of service over oth-
ers. 
Behind the absolutist position is a strong faith in the importance of 
neutral public infrastructures as a social good that promotes economic 
growth and decentralized innovation.  A main problem with the absolut-
ist position is that it needs a clear rule on scope.  Some problematic ques-
tions arise such as, can a carrier practice customer discrimination and 
discrimination between customers on the basis of ability to pay?  Can it 
practice network discrimination and have no connection whatsoever to, 
say, the internet?  The absolute position must be coupled to clear zoning 
of allowable discrimination, as in the public/private distinction discussed 
 62. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1) (2000). 
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above, to avoid absurd results. 
2. Grounds 
A second approach suggests that carrier’s discrimination as between 
content or network points that consumers want to reach is generally ille-
gal, subject to various categorical exceptions.  The difference between 
this approach and the absolutist approach is that it accepts that discrimi-
nation may be good in some instances and bad in others.  It seeks the de-
velopment of network discrimination norms that distinguish between the 
two. 
When proposals vary, the bases of justified discrimination are usu-
ally two: 
 
1. Prevention of public harms; 
2. The provisioning of services for which discrimination is  neces-
sary. 
 
As an example, an early version of a House’s Draft 2005 Telecom Re-
form bill included a ban on discrimination that nonetheless allowed car-
riers to take measures to (inter alia): 
 
1. Protect the security and reliability of its network and broad-
band Internet transmission services; or 
2. Prevent theft of [Internet services] or other unlawful conduct; 
or 
3. Carry or offer a broadband video service or any other service 
that provides enhanced quality of service to subscribers 
through the [Internet] provider’s utilization of network and 
routing management or customized hardware, except that such 
carrying or offering of such services may not block, or unrea-
sonably impair or interfere with, the offering of, access to, or  
the use of any lawful content, application, or service provided 
over the Internet may  not unreasonably restrict the right of 
subscribers under subsection to connect and use devices. 
 
While absolutists challenge discrimination even when intended to fight 
public harms like discrimination against persistent spammers on the 
internet, the first ground tends to be less controversial.  More controver-
sial is discrimination practiced for the purpose of providing services.  For 
example, as discussed above, cable operators currently discriminate be-
tween their own video services and the data they carry, favoring the for-
mer over the latter to deliver a high quality signal.  The various plans for 
fiber-based television services contemplate reserving wavelengths for 
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television services. 
The argument in favor of allowing such discrimination is simply 
this: but for the discrimination, a publicly attractive service will not or 
cannot be offered.  Furthermore, but for permission to reserve a wave-
length for television alone, telephony carriers won’t be in a position to 
offer television services. 
 
As absolutists point out, the danger is that the exception can quickly 
swallow the rule.  A carrier may begin offering so many “special” ser-
vices that its service competitors on the public internet suffer by com-
parison, rather than merit.  Moreover, absolutists insist, the services in 
question can in fact be provided over a public, non-discriminatory chan-
nel.  One reason a carrier might want to offer television service over a 
reserved wavelength is to give themselves a means to prevent others 
from developing effective, competitive services. 
3. Like Treatment 
A third approach focuses on the concept of “like treatment,” a con-
cept central to the anti-discrimination rules used in the international trad-
ing system.  In the international trading system, as in telecommunica-
tions, the premise is that distortionary forms of discrimination are 
principally those which operate on the basis of identity.  In trade, if a 
country bans tomatoes from Italy but not from Spain, the result is a dis-
tortion of competition in the tomato market.  For that reason, the trading 
system generally bars country from discriminatory treatment of “like 
products.” 
In the telecommunications context, the premise is that treating in-
formation from one firm or carrier any differently than from another car-
rier based only on the identity of the carrier will similarly distort the pro-
duction market for that information.  An inefficient provider may 
dominate the market not because of a superior product but because of 
preferential access to the network. 
Interestingly this approach continues to allow some forms of dis-
crimination on the network.  It mandates, however, that the discrimina-
tion undertaken must be related to the content in question, and not the 
source of the information.  For example, an internet carrier might decide 
to speed up the delivery of all video packets on the network, a difference 
in treatment driven by the differences in the underlying information type.  
But what the carrier may not do under this approach is to choose favor-
ites, to treat similarly situated packets differently. 
A sample of language embodying this approach, as applied to a 
network carrier, looks as follows: “A carrier may prioritize content, ap-
plications, or services within the operator’s networks based only on the 
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type of content, applications, or services and the level of service pur-
chased by the user, without charge for such prioritization.” 
D. Anti-Discrimination Remedies 
Any anti-discrimination system needs a system of remedies.  Here 
there is an important and basic theoretical distinction between negative 
and positive anti-discrimination rules. A negative rule announces that 
discrimination is illegal and seeks to punish identified episodes of dis-
crimination on a case-by-case basis.  A positive rule, conversely, identi-
fies likely areas where discrimination will be a problem, and creates af-
firmative legal duties that are intended to remedy either past or the 
likelihood of future discrimination. 
While there is great debate over this matter in other contexts, few 
can deny that enforcing a negative prohibition puts the government in its 
more familiar and easier position of forbidding bad behavior instead of 
trying to compel good behavior. As Charles Fried put the point in an-
other context, “[d]iscrimination . . . should be stamped out whenever it 
occurs.  This, like all the most stringent injunctions of morality, is a 
negative—not a positive—duty. ‘Thou shall not kill’ is an injunction at 
once more absolute, more definite, and more readily enforced than “Love 
your neighbor as yourself.”63
In the telecommunications context “love thy neighbor” policies are 
positive remedies; rules of compelled sharing, particularly those pursuant 
to government-set rates. As with a positive moral duty, it would be nice 
if incumbent phone companies would share their lines with entrants, but 
creating a duty to do so pursuant to government rates has by common 
consensus proved a disaster.  The FCC’s role is decidedly simpler when 
it enforces “thou shall nots.”  Whenever possible, the Congress and the 
FCC should rely on a negative anti-discrimination rule.  
This distinction between a negative anti-discrimination rule and 
positive duties may seem slippery when the question of remedies is 
reached. If the government encounters a discrimination problem and 
seeks to cure it, it may issue injunctive orders and thereby converts the 
negative rule into a series of positive duties.  But as we shall discuss in 
this section, administration of an anti-discrimination rule need not neces-
sarily be so complex. 
A typical remedy in a telecommunications context is an “intercon-
nection remedy.”  One carrier has a record or practice of refusing to con-
nect with others like local telephone carriers, for example, that refuse to 
allow non-preferred long distance carriers to reach their customers.  The 
government, to combat the discrimination, orders interconnection.  The 
 63. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW 130 (1991). 
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long-standing assumption is that any such interconnection remedy will 
require a complex, government administered rate-setting scheme.  The 
government, the argument goes, will have to set the prices for access to 
the carriers’ customers, thereby converting any anti-discrimination rule 
into an affirmative price-setting schema. 
These views are misleading.  An anti-discrimination regime need 
not rely on government price-setting at all or, stated otherwise, it can rely 
on the setting of prices at zero which is not administratively difficult.64  
In the interconnection context, while there remains debate, economists 
have persuasively argued, under the mantra of “bill and keep,” that an 
economically efficient interconnection scheme can be maintained with-
out a system of government-set compensation for forced interconnec-
tion.65  The premise is that both ends of any connection benefit from in-
ter-connection and that the best system is to have carriers on both sides 
collect from their customers for the connection. 
Imagine, circa 1980, that long distance firm MCI wants to be able to 
reach customers on Pacific Bell’s local network.  One government rem-
edy is to set prices that MCI must pay Pacific Bell for the privilege of 
accessing its network.  Another approach, however, is to simply order 
that Pac Bell accept MCI’s calls, but give Pacific Bell the right to charge 
its own customers for the connection. In this alternative scheme the gov-
ernment sets the connection rule but is not directly involved in setting 
prices as between the two carriers. 
There are of course arguments against bill and keep, and its effi-
ciency depends on the degree of symmetry of traffic between providers.  
But the point here is not to advocate bill and keep, but rather reverse the 
presumption that anti-discrimination rules necessarily require complex 
price-setting schemes.  Restated slightly, the anti-discrimination proposal 
here envisions as much freedom as possible from complex price setting 
schemes, coupled with serious injunctive remedies for violation of clear 
anti-discrimination rules. 
IV.  CHALLENGES 
The main challenge to these proposals and in fact, a typical chal-
 64. Gerald Brock points out, for example, that the deregulation of consumer network at-
tachments can also be labeled an interconnection requirement with a price set at zero.  See 
GERALD W. BROCK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCONNECTION (Teleport Communications 
Group 1995). 
 65. See Atkinson & Barnekov, supra note 49.; Patrick DeGraba, Central Office Bill and 
Keep as a Unified Inter-Carrier Compensation Regime, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 40 (2002); 
Patrick DeGraba, Efficient Intercarrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Custom-
ers Share the Value of a Call, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 151, 207 (2003); for an good 
survey of the issues see Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 369 (2004). 
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lenge to anti-discrimination or network neutrality rules is that the rules 
get the problem of market entry wrong.  More particularly, the rules de-
stroy the incentives for the market entry of transport providers.  As the 
Congressional Research Service restates the argument “the physical net-
work providers (local exchange carriers and cable system operators) ar-
gue that they will be discouraged from undertaking costly and risky 
broadband network build-outs and upgrades if their networks are subject 
to open access and/or non-discrimination requirements that might limit 
their ability to exploit vertical integration efficiencies or to maximize the 
return on (or even fully recoup) their investments.”66
While loudly proclaimed, the salience of this argument against anti-
discrimination rules is greatly overstated.  There is little question that 
market entry in any infrastructure market is likely to be challenging.  
However, that is for reasons having little to do with anti-discrimination 
rules and everything to do with recovering the considerable costs of in-
frastructure deployments. 
The initial investment necessary to provide any network connection 
has always been high and remains so today.  Consequently, the only in-
stances of successful market entry are either pursuant to government sub-
sidy or in order to provide a radically innovative or improved product.  
Examples of the later include the original telephone networks, cable tele-
vision, television broadcasting, and so on.  In each instances, the entrant 
at the physical layer provided the consumer with access to a service that 
did not exist previously. 
The challenge of entry to offer a marginally superior, or competing 
product are much more profound.  It runs into the natural monopoly 
problem in infrastructure that is familiar across industries.  But so too are 
its chief remedies (1) opening the market to as many potential entrants as 
possible, (2) government subsidization of one kind or another, and (3) 
direct government build-outs. 
The challenge of encouraging infrastructure deployments is real.  
Additionally, it is true that an exemption from anti-discrimination rules 
may, on the margin, encourage some deployment.  But the idea that the 
government’s best answer should be an exemption from anti-
discrimination rules is bizarre.  As stated in the premise, there are good 
reasons to believe that economic growth depends on open market entry.  
Why then, among the possible means of encouraging physical infrastruc-
ture deployment, allowing the blocking of market entry seems among the 
worst possible choices.  The analogy here is to Ramsay pricing.  Gov-
ernment should, when it must regulate, choose its least-distorting of 
means.  Encouraging deployment by allowing operators to block applica-
 66. CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM 7 (Aug. 12, 2005). 
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tions seems among the most distortionary choices available. 
It is also highly unclear whether discrimination is, in fact, a profit-
able long-term policy, and so allowing it as a form of subsidy may fail. It 
is hard to see clearly that the potential revenues that might stem from be-
ing allowed to block customers from applications will be enough to en-
courage companies to invest in the cost of infrastructure deployment ab-
sent any other prospect of profit. Instead, it seems that if government 
wants to promote the construction of new infrastructure, it should do so 
directly, either by providing direct subsidies, or by doing so itself. 
In other respects, the anti-discrimination rules may also promote 
transport layer market entry.  Some anti-discrimination rules protect 
transport entrants who are protected from horizontal discrimination; that 
is to say, require physical interconnection with other transport providers. 
Second, while not yet seen, an ex ante rule may block discrimination 
practiced by powerful application providers. In other words, the transport 
layer entrant, as much as anyone else, has reason to want a law that pre-
vents blocking market entry. 
CONCLUSION 
One way of understanding the communications law is to see it as 
preoccupied with two main problems: allocating rights, and managing 
discrimination.  The problem of allocating rights, as in spectrum, cable 
franchising, and other areas, hasn’t gone away altogether, but is a dimin-
ishing and increasingly hard to justify part of the telecommunications 
laws.  Conversely, the other side of the law, managing problems of dis-
crimination, seems unlikely to go away now, or ever. 
Given these developments, this paper presents telecommunications 
law with a challenge.  How much of the present Telecommunications 
Act’s objectives might be accomplished with a focus on a central anti-
discrimination rule?  The one-rule model provides one answer. 
 
